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THE BOROUGH PRESIDENT:
COMMUNITY LEADER OR EXCESS POLITICAL BAGGAGE
I. INTRODUCTION

Although the borough presidency was retained after the abolishment of
the powerful Board of Estimate on which the borough presidents sat, the
future of the office, however, was not clear.' Stripped of most of its power
in 1989, the borough presidency's role needed to be redefined.2 Almost a
decade later, there are those who believe the office, as reworked, is
unnecessary. 3 The borough presidency, however, remains an important
and necessary political institution because it represents a distinct entity
within New York City, serves important community needs, and balances
power between the mayor and the boroughs.4
This Note explores the redefined role of the borough presidency in a
post-Board of Estimate New York City. 5 Part II reviews the history of the
borough presidency from the time of consolidation to the demise of the
Board of Estimate. Part III explains the Board of Estimate and the borough
presidents' place on the board. Parts IV and V examine the rationales for
retaining the borough presidency after the abolishment of the Board of
Estimate. Part VI provides a brief overview of the new powers ascribed
to the office under the 1989 Charter revision. 6 Part VII explores the
redefined role of the borough president. Finally, Part VIII concludes with
reasons for retaining the borough presidency.

1. See Maurice Carroll, Guy Molinari: Still Fighting City Hall, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
Aug. 7, 1991, at 21 ("lThe borough presidents] are struggling to prevent the... job from
fading away.").
2. See id. ("Since they lost their votes on the now-defunct Board of Estimate, [the
borough presidents] have had to redefine their roles.").

3. See Jonathan P. Hicks, 5 Presidents Without (Much) Portfolio; Doubts Are Raised
About Largely CeremonialBorough Chief Post, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1996, at 29.

4. See infra notes 49-132 and accompanying text.
5. The Board of Estimate was abolished under the 1989 Charter revision. See N.Y.
CITY CHARTER ch. 3 (1989).
6. See generally id. ch. 4 § 82 (1989).
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II. HISTORY OF THE BOROUGH PRESIDENCY
Greater New York City consolidated into its present form on January
1, 1898.' Before the consolidation there were no boroughs. 8 Prior to
1898, Manhattan, Brooklyn (now Kings County), and Staten Island (now
Richmond County) were counties of New York State. 9 The consolidation
of boroughs ushered in boroughs as geographic and political entities."
At consolidation, Manhattan and Brooklyn were in their present
forms. " Queens became a borough by the combination of Long Island City
and Queens County. 2 The Bronx, part of which had constituted a portion
of the old New York City, was combined with parts of Yonkers and some
towns and villages of lower Westchester County.' 3
Consolidation gave rise to the borough presidency.' 4 Initially, the
borough president, although an elected official, exercised little authority
and was mainly a figurehead, merely representing former autonomy within
a recently centralized system.' 5 This aspect of the consolidation
compromise was intended to avoid appearances of overcentralization. 6
However, the boroughs soon demanded a stronger, more substantial voice
in the governance of their city to avoid the overcentralization of city
services and political power, as envisioned by the initial compromise. '7 In

7. See WALLACE S. SAYRE & HERBERT KAUFMAN, GOVERNING NEW YORK CITY:
POLITICS INTHE METROPOLIS 11 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1965) (1960).
8. See generally id.
9. See id.
10. See CITIZENS UNION FOUNDATION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, BOROUGH
REPRESENTATION 3 (1989).
11. See id.at9.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id.at 3 ("The borough was made a political subdivision of Greater New York

...with its own elected 'mayor' or president. .. ").
15. See id. at 1 ("[Elarly in the city's history ... the borough presidents received
very little power in the first Charter."); SAYRE &KAUFMAN, supra note 7, at 14 ("The new
government of the new city was to be strongly centralized; power was to be concentrated
in City Hall, although the five boroughs . . . were each to have a President with some
governmental functions.").
16. See generally SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 7.
17. See CITIZENS UNION FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 3 ("Brooklyn aldermen

argued immediately for increased local authority to protect their borough's own interests and
that of the other outer boroughs."); SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 7, at 16 ("[Ihe
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response to these concerns, the 1901 Charter, the city's second Charter,
introduced sweeping changes to the structure of city governance." The
most important, and long lasting of these changes was the reorganization
of the Board of Estimate and Apportionment 9 (discussed in Part III of this
Note), and the appointment of the borough presidents to the Board. The
appointment of the borough presidents to the Board marked the beginning
of their shift from an executive function to a quasi-legislative function."
Although this transformation was relatively gradual, Charter changes made
in 1938 and 1961 "effectively removed the executive power that the
borough presidents enjoyed over city agencies."'" Initially, borough
presidents were responsible for providing City services to their respective
boroughs.22 Over time, this executive function diminished because of the
centralization of these services.' By 1963, nearly all of the borough
presidents' executive functions were relegated to City agencies.24
As the borough presidents' executive powers in their respective
boroughs diminished, their significance as members of the Board of

borough governments were enhanced [by the 1901 Charter revision] at the expense of power
at City Hall . . ").
18. See SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 7, at 16.

19. See id. ("The key institutional instrument in producing these changes was the
creation of a newly designed Board of Estimate and Apportionment. ...
20. See generally id.
21. Joseph P. Viteritti, Municipal Home Rule and the Conditions of Justifiable
Secession, 23 FORDHAM URR. L.J. 1, 52 (1995).
22. See SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 7, at 638.

23. See id. The borough presidents' responsibilities were:
primarily relat[ed] to the building and maintenance of the boroughs' local streets,
roads, bridges, and tunnels, regulating certain uses of the streets, and control of
borough sewers and drainage systems ....[These powers have] steadily reduced
in significance as borough streets bec[a]me arterial highways, as the bridges and
tunnels [were] made part of larger systems, and other agencies . . .buil[t]

parkways and expressways across their boroughs.
Id.
24. See GUIDE TO THE MUNICIPAL
(Thelma E.Smith ed., 10th ed. 1973).
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Estimate necessarily grew.' The Board of Estimate gave significance and
power to the borough presidency until the constitutional legitimacy of the
Board itself came into question. 26
III. THE BOARD OF ESTIMATE

"On the chessboard of the city's politics, the Moroguayor may be king,
but the Board of Estimate is queen. " This quote summarizes the powerful
role the Board of Estimate once played in the arena of New York City
governance.28 It also explains the understandable concern many expressed
regarding the borough presidency once the Board was abolished.29
However, before examining the effects of the Board's rather abrupt exit
from city government, it is important to understand why the borough
presidents' seats on that body were viewed as being so important."
The Board, established in 1901, consisted of the mayor, the
comptroller, the president of the Council (now the public advocate), and
the five borough presidents. 3' It was considered the most powerful player
in city governance because of the scope of its review and decision-making
powers. 32 The Board acted as both an upper chamber in a "pseudobicameral legislature"3 3 and as a "quasi-executive body." 34 Its legislative
3
powers stemmed from its broad grant of review over Council legislation, 1
and its executive functions were derived from its significant budget and

25. See SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 7, at 638 ("It is in the Board of Estimate as
representatives of the boroughs... that the Borough Presidents achieve their importance
as officials.").
26. See generally Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989) (holding that the
Board of Estimate's voting structure violated the "one person-one vote" doctrine).
27. SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 7, at 652.
28. See id.
29. See, e.g., Dennis Duggan, BPs: The Appendix of City Politics,NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
Dec. 4, 1990, at 8 ("The five [borough presidents] were shorn of real power this year by
the new City Charter, which abolished the Board of Estimate, where they each had a vote.
It was like amputating San Francisco quarterback Joe Montana's throwing arm.").
30. See SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 7, at 626 (The members of the Board of
Estimate "are the most influential elected officials in the city government").
31. See generally id. ch. XVII.
32. See generally id.
33. See id. at 627 ("It [was] difficult for the Council to discover local laws which [did]
not come within the [realm of Board of Estimate review].").
34. See id. at 631.
35. See id. at 627 (describing the broad grant of review over the most important
legislative functions of the Council, including the power to amend the Charter and taxation).
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administrative powers.36 Accordingly, membership on the Board of
Estimate was inherently significant. 37 "[I]ts eight members [were] the most
influential elected officials in the city government."3" Thus, it is not
difficult to understand the resonant effect eliminating the Board would have

on its members' position in city governance. 39 For some, like the mayor

and comptroller, the end of the Board meant a boon in their power, because
the executive authority the Board possessed was channeled to their
offices.40 For the borough presidents and the council president, however,
4
the future of their power was
42 uncertain. ' Perhaps, the very existence of
their offices was at stake.
The challenge that led to the Board's demise began with a lawsuit that
culminated in a Supreme Court decision which held that the Board's voting
scheme violated the "one person-one vote" doctrine. 43 The "one personone vote" doctrine is violated when a citizen in one district may vote for
only one representative to a governmental body, while a citizen in another
district, half the size, also votes for one representative to that same body.44
The Board of Estimate violated the doctrine because only one
representative, the borough president, was elected from the populous
boroughs of Queens and Brooklyn, while Staten Island, the least populous
borough, exercised the same voting power. 45
The Charter Revision Commission, meeting when the Supreme Court
decision was handed down, considered many alternatives to the then

36. See id. at 628 (categorizing the Board's powers, not shared with the Council, as:
financial controls; control of City property; control of franchises; control of City personnel;
and control of City planning and zoning).
37.

See generally id.

38. Id. at 626.
39. See Bob Liff, Golden Holdingonto What's Left, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Aug. 8, 1991,
at 23 ("Their role in City Hall has effectively ended. .. ").
40.

See Donald H. Elliot, Changing the Rules of the Land Use Game: The New City

Charter,N.Y.L.J., Nov. 14, 1989, at I ("[S]ome political observers have said that the new
Charter will create an imperial mayor...."); Jennifer Preston, Officials: We Want Some
More, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Jan. 31, 1990, at7 (explaining how the city comptroller requested
156 new hires "because of [the] additional responsibilities under the new City Charter").
41.

See William Murphy, Borough Presidents Offer New Role; Seek Some Controlof

Money, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), May 5, 1989, at 19 ("The vice chair of the Charter Revision
Commission ... said.., the commission was hampered in its efforts by the lack of a clear
sense from the borough presidents as to what their role should be."); see also Liff, supra
note 39.
42.

See Alan Finder, Borough Chiefand Critics Split on the Charter, N.Y. TIMES,

June 8, 1989, at B3 (reporting vocal criticism of the borough presidency by those who
wanted to see the office abolished during the Charter revision).
43. See id.; see also Board of Estimate v. Morris, 489 U.S. 688 (1989).
44. See Board of Estimate, 489 U.S. at 693-94.
45. See id. at 703.
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current voting scheme, 46 but ultimately determined that the Board of

Estimate was an unwieldy and undemocratic dinosaur that could not be
restructured to comply with the "one-person, one-vote" doctrine and was
best buried.47 With the Board gone, the borough president's role in a postBoard of Estimate city was in question.48
IV. POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS FOR RETAINING
THE BOROUGH PRESIDENCY

According to Eric Lane, executive director and counsel to the Charter
Revision Commission, there was never any doubt that the borough
presidency would be retained.4 9 Any moves to eliminate the office could
have been disastrous for the Commission." In the Commission's view, any
attempt to dispense with the borough presidents would have met with such
strong political opposition that the Charter revision would have failed at the
polls in the November 1989 Charter referendum." This is one reason the
possibility was never seriously considered by the Commission. 2
There was also a genuine commitment to redefining the borough
presidents' role in a post-Board of Estimate government. 53 As described
above, the borough president's role was drastically removed from its roots
as borough executive and, instead, entrenched as a quasi-legislative

46. See Frank J. Mauro & Gerald Benjamin, Voting Rights and the Board ofEstimate:
The Emergence of an Issue, in RESTRUCTURING THE NEW YoRK CITY GOVERNMENT: THE
REEMERGENCE OFMUNICIPALREFORM 62 (Frank J. Mauro & Gerald Benjamin eds., 1989)
("During the summer of 1987, concomitantly with the commencement of its studies of the
board's major functions, the commission staff began analyzing the various proposals that
had been advanced for complying with the one-person, one-vote principle by changing the
board's voting structure, its composition, or both.").
47. See Todd S. Purdum, CharterPanelRejects EstimateBoardandTurns to Council,
N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1989, at BI.
48. See William Murphy, Beep's Roles Remains up in theAir, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), May
5, 1989, at 40 ("But neither the borough presidents nor the commission members can agree

on a key issue-whether the borough presidents in their new incarnation should have either
or both voting power or advisory power.").

49. See Interview with Professor Eric Lane, former Executive Director and Counsel,
Ravitch and Schwarz Charter Revision Commissions, in New York, N.Y. (Oct. 16, 1997)
(on file with the New York Law School Law Review) [hereinafter Lane Interview].
50. See Professor Eric Lane, remarks made at New York Law School during class,
The New York City Charter:Structure, Powers and Procedures(Oct. 23 & Oct. 30, 1997)
(on file with the New York Law School Law Review) [hereinafter Lane Remarks].
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
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representative on the Board of Estimate. 4 The new Charter revision
attempted to reassign the borough presidents to a role as mid-level
executives. 5
In order for the borough presidents to achieve this transformation into
mid-level executives, the Charter Revision Commission needed to reassign
them powers that would reorient them to their new status.5 6 The areas
where the borough presidents were ultimately assigned their new powers
and duties parallel the powers of the former Board of Estimate.5 7 The most
important of areas include budget modification, land use, and contract and
service oversight.5
V. MORAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR RETAINING
THE BOROUGH PRESIDENCY 59

In 1900, only two years after the incorporation of Greater New York
City, Brooklyn and Manhattan already had populations exceeding one
million each.6' The Bronx had over 200,000 inhabitants, and Queens and
Staten Island had 152,999 and 67,021, respectively. 6' The recognition of
each borough as a distinct entity within New York City is well-founded and
has perpetuated a sense of borough "pride." 62 This pride cannot be ignored
in the face of history and the perceptions of the city's populace.6 3 In light
of the communal feeling a borough engenders in its populace and the
important historical place the boroughs have in the city's history,
abolishing the borough presidency would have been an unwarranted

54. See supra notes 14-24 and accompanying text.
55. See Letter from Charter Revision Commission to Barry H. Weinberg, Esq.,
Acting Chief, Voting Rights Section, Civil Rights Division, United States Department of
Justice 41 (Aug. 11, 1989) (on file with the New York Law School Law Review) ("[The
proposed charter assigns certain new powers to the borough presidents as executives...

56. See id.
57. Compare N.Y. CITY CHARTERch. 3 (1989) (enumerating the powers of the Board
of Estimate) with N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 4 (1989) (enumerating the new powers of the
borough presidents).
58. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, SUMMARY OF FINAL PROPOSALS 13
(1989); see also N.Y. CITY CHARTER §§ 82, 245, 251, 333 (1989).
59. The concept that these reasons are "moral" was phrased by Professor Eric Lane.
60. See SAYRE &KAUFMAN, supra note 7, at 18.

61. See id.
62. See CITIZENS UNION FOUNDATION, supra note 10, at 16 (After social, racial, and
ethnic identification, "the borough, as the most geographically and sociologically distinct
governmental subdivision, is for most individuals the next strongest level of
identification.").
63.

See id.
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infringement on perceived and actual borough autonomy and would have
compromised the entire Charter revision.' Any attempt to abolish the
borough presidency would have been met with such hostility that the
despite a great expenditure of
Charter revision would have been rejected
65
time, effort, and financial resources.
VI. AN OVERVIEW OF THE BOROUGH PRESIDENTS' NEW POWERS

A. Budget Powers
The Board of Estimate's budget powers included the authority to
change the expense budget during the fiscal year and to approve the capital
budget.6 These powers have been transferred over to the borough
presidents via an apportionment mechanism that gives the borough
presidents a discretionary five percent, in the aggregate, towards the
expense and capital budgets.67 The remaining portion of the budgeting
power is vested with the mayor and City Council. 8 The five percent figure
is based on an estimate of the proportional influence the borough presidents
had wielded as members of the Board of Estimate. 9 The mayor must
include the borough presidents' proposals in the executive budget and "may
70
not disapprove any of these items if they are adopted by the council.
These expense and capital budget powers have significance in two
ways. First, the figures presented by the borough presidents are
substantial. 7 ' In 1992, for example, the capital budget allocation for
Brooklyn was forty-three million dollars.' Second, according to former
Manhattan Borough President Ruth Messinger, the old system created last
minute negotiations among the members of the Board of Estimate.73 Now,
the process is much more level-headed for the boroughs, because each

64. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.

65. See id.
66. See SAYRE & KAUFMAN, supra note 7, at 627.

67. See N. Y. CITY CHARTER REVISION COMM'N, FINAL REPORT OF THE NEW YORK
CITY CHARTER REVISION COMMISSION, JAN. 1989-Nov. 1989, at 32 (1990) [hereinafter
FINAL REPORT].
68. See generally N.Y. CITY CHARTER chs. 1, 2, 6, 9 (1989).
69. See Lane Interview, supra note 49.
70. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 32.
71. See Alison Mitchell, Howard Golden Sees Things HeDoesn'tLike, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 1992, § 1, at 27.
72. See id.

73. See id.
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borough is given a set amount to work with and may weigh budgeting
options.7'
B. Land Use
Under the old Charter, the Board of Estimate had plenary control over
the land-use decisions in the city.75 This power was enormous considering
that "land is what the city is about."'76 The new Charter transferred the
Board's review powers on land use to the City Council.77 However, the
borough presidents' power is retained in two ways. 7' Each appoints one
member to the twelve member City Planning Commission, and the borough
presidents may compel review of certain City Planning Commission
decisions by offering an objection.7 9
The Brooklyn Borough President's Office has successfully used its
objection powers to block construction of an annex for the New York State
Supreme Court and used its influence to change the Port Authority's
decision to sell piers on the Brooklyn waterfront." It also gained approval
for a plan to improve Brooklyn's Red Hook neighborhood, a region of
Brooklyn neglected for many years."
The borough of Queens provides additional examples of the type of
work the borough presidents do to further land use decisions that affect
their boroughs 8 In 1994, the Queens Borough President's Office worked
on several land use and development projects, including Edgemere8 3 and
Arverne8 4 urban renewal, increasing residential and retail opportunities in
Downtown Flushing, and reviving the Willets Point area. 5

74. See id.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 19.
Lane Interview, supra note 49.
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 20.
See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 8 (1989).

79. See id.
80. See OFFICE OF THE BROOKLYN BOROUGH PRESIDENT, BROOKLYN STATE OF THE
BOROUGH REPORT 140, 143 (1997).
81. See id.
82. See OFFICE OF THE
BOROUGH REPORT 21 (1994).

QUEENS BOROUGH PRESIDENT, QUEENS STATE OF THE

83. See id. ("This project will bring 400 New York City Partnership-sponsored, twofamily homes as well as new parks, streets and sewers to the Rockaways.").

84. See id. at 22 ("[D]evelop[ment] [of] a marketable parcelization plan that
maximizes benefits to the surrounding community and ensures successful realization of the
approved plan.").

85. See id. at 23 (describing how this area will be converted from a "junk yard" into
a business center).
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C. Contract Oversight
Another important area in which the borough president has retained
power is contract oversight. The standard procedure for the procurement
of goods was not altered by the Charter revision. 86 This procedure consists
of "competitive sealed bidding, with [the] award to the lowest responsible
bidder .... ,87 However, a large portion of the contracts were considered
"special cases" that are not approved through the standard procedure.8 8
"In practice, this approval came after the agency had chosen both an
alternative method and a vendor." 89 The Commission found that this
approval process: (1) had very little impact on city policy, since action by
the Board of Estimate was limited to reviewing individual contracts and
occurred at the end of the process, and (2) had undermined the integrity of
the procurement process by diffusing accountability for procurement
decisions among the eight members of the Board. "The 1989 revisions of
the Charter replaced this process with one in which policy decisions are to
be made by the legislative branch before implementation; and,
accountability for implementation is clearly fixed with the city's chief
executive."90
The role of the borough president in this area, thus, has shifted from
participating in the shortcomings of the Board to providing oversight for
his or her respective borough. Thus, the borough presidents have retained
some of the power they enjoyed as Board of Estimate members, allowing
them to fulfill a portion of their responsibilities as borough-wide
executives.91
D. OTHER POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES
The borough presidents' other powers and responsibilities include, but
are not limited to: maintaining a topographical bureau; 92 recommending
capital projects; holding public hearings "on matters of public interest; "'
maintaining a borough planning office;95 preparing a strategic policy

86. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 67, at 24.
87. Id.

88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
92. See N.Y. CITY CHARTER ch. 4 § 82(3) (1989).
93. See id. § 82(4).
94. Id. § 82(5).
95. See id. § 82(9).
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statement every four years; 96 and having the privilege of introducing
All of these powers give the borough
legislation with the Council.'
presidency vestiges of its former power on the Board.18 However, the
majority of their duties involve oversight rather than actual policy. 9 This
oversight fuels the debate over the significance of the borough presidency
as it currently exists.
VII. THE REDEFINED BOROUGH PRESIDENCY
Understandably, the borough presidents' initial reaction to the
elimination of the Board of Estimate was one of great concern for their
future as key political participants. 10° The validity of the borough
presidency in a post-Board city was in question. °1 In fact, opponents of
the office believed its legitimacy ended with the Board's demise. 0 2 A new
role for the borough presidents, however, has to be tolerated by politicians
and pundits alike because their existence in city governance did not perish
along with the Board. 0 3
In order to justify the continued existence of the borough presidency,
the office must be viewed not only as a vestige of a defunct city body, but
also as a significant office in its own right. 104 There are valid arguments
that the elimination of the Board has thoroughly diminished the powers of
the borough presidents to impotent irrelevancy.105 Equally as tenable are
arguments that the borough presidents, as executives, are throwbacks to0a6
romanticized, nostalgic view of the boroughs as autonomous cities.

96. See id. § 82(14).
97. See id. § 82(11).
98. See generally N.Y. CITY CHARTER chs. 3-4 (1989).
99.

See generally id.

100. Maurice Carroll, Wy Borough Power Must Be Preserved, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
May 10, 1989, at 65 ("[Claire Shulman, borough president of Queens, said that she does]

not see any specific role for the borough presidents in the [citywide] government loop...
101. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
102. See Alan Finder, Pro & Con: Remaking the Government; Do New York's
Borough PresidentsStill Have Jobs Worth Paying For?, N.Y. TIMEs, July 9, 1989, at D5.
103. See supra notes 49-65 and accompanying text.
104. See Carol Bellamy & William Josephson, About Politics; Chart a Course for
Boroughs, NEWSDAY (N.Y.), May 30, 1989, at 42.
105. See Maurice Carroll, FerrerTries to Maintain His Clout, NEWSDAY (N.Y.),
Aug. 5, 1991, at 19 ("The Bronx borough president opposed the City Charter changes that
abolished the Board of Estimate role and he noted in his City Club talk the persisting
perception that he and his fellow borough presidents are not much municipal use

anymore.").
106. See supra notes 7-13 and accompanying text.
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These arguments, however, are often hyperbolic and fixated on the
financial impact of the borough presidents' offices. ' 7 On the other hand,
there is ample evidence that the borough presidency serves a valid role that
far outweighs its economic effect and that representation at the borough
level protects a number of genuine interests."'
A. Borough President as Mid-Level Executive
New York City does not foster the type of government where
legislative authority commands the greatest authority. " Because New York
State oversees so many city functions, the authority to set agendas is what
really governs New York City. 1 0 Agenda-setting power is the ability to
control the movement of policy in one direction or another. ' As members
of the Board of Estimate, borough presidents certainly had this power to 1a2
certain extent, but it focused more on immediate political demands."
Strategic planning was not a consideration."' What the structure of the
new Charter offers is an opportunity for borough presidents to be involved
in the often overlooked, but all important, mid-term and long-term policy
This function is realized through the borough
planning process."'
presidents' mandate, set by the 1989 Charter, to produce a strategic
planning statement every four years, in addition to making ongoing
evaluations and recommendations on behalf of borough residents." 5 It
could be argued that all of these "powers" amount to nothing more than the
right to critique and suggest." 6 Even so, it could be counterargued that the

107. See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 3, at 29.
The city's five borough presidents each are paid $114,000 a year. Collectively,
they employ 466 workers, and their offices have a combined budget of $32.5
million for the current fiscal year. In 1988, just before the new City Charter took
away most of the offices' powers, the combined budget for the five chiefs was
$28.5 million. Thus, although their duties have diminished, their budgets have

risen.
Id.
108.
109.

See generally supra notes 49-99 and accompanying text.
See Lane Remarks, supra note 50.

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.

115.

See N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 82(14) (1989).

116.

See supra notes 66-99 and accompanying text.
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onus to perform and accomplish is then placed on the borough president,
and only those who fight for influence will gain the respect, trust, and vote
of their constituents." 7 If such a power base is achieved, as it must be
under the new political conditions, then the agenda-setting power can have
a very significant effect for a borough."'
B. Borough Presidentas the Borough "PublicAdvocate"
In a city the size of New York, there is little argument that, for the
average citizen, getting the ear of City Hall can be an overwhelmingly
frustrating experience. " 9 Although the borough presidents may no longer
be able to join in a voting block against the citywide elected officials, they
can still act as a voice for borough concerns that will resonate louder than
any single council member or community board. 20 Although a council
member can curry political favor for his or her constituents by using
legislative leverage against the executive, no single member will have as
much of an impact as a borough president.'' Borough presidents carry the
weight of an entire borough behind them. If the constituents are on his or
her side, the mayor may be flirting with political disaster to ignore that
weight." Therefore, the borough president has the de facto authority to
act as a "public advocate" for his or her borough.
Comparing New York City to a state, it is easy to see why a "public
advocate" is good for a borough. Any state has county authorities that
exert legitimate political pressures on the state's centralized authority."'3
Given New York's size and complexity, it seems not only legitimate, but
also politically advantageous, to grant the boroughs a voice as distinct
entities. For this to work most effectively, a leader must speak for each
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entity. In the case of New York City, this voice comes from the boroughs
through each respective president.
C. Borough Presidentas Balancerof Power
The criticism that Manhattan wields too much influence has been a
complaint of "outer" borough residents for many years.2 4 The borough
president can be viewed as a balance to real or perceived favoritism
towards the borough of Manhattan. 25 As Queens' current Borough
President Claire Shulman said: "My constituents are not protected from
the enormous power that resides with. . . Manhattan ....Manhattan has
'
always had first crack at whatever resources were available." 126
The
borough presidency is a counter to this "Manhattan-centrism."
The borough president's role as balancer of power was demonstrated
in 1997 when former Manhattan Borough President Ruth Messinger
challenged the mayor on his failure to release certain city documents to
Borough President Messinger's office. 127 The dispute arose after
Messinger's office received complaints about mayoral agencies not
responding to Freedom of Information Law ("FOIL") requests. 2
Messinger approached the issue by requesting, under FOIL, data relating
to agency responses to FOIL requests."' The mayor, through Corporation
Counsel Paul Crotty, denied the FOIL requests. 0 Messinger brought suit
to compel disclosure.' 3' Justice Omanksy of the New York State Supreme
Court decided in favor of Messinger.' 32 This case illustrates the importance
of a borough president in vindicating the rights of its constituents when
centralized city forces overstep their powers.
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VIII. CONCLUSION

The borough presidency has undergone significant transformations in
its role since the founding of Greater New York City in 1898.' Starting
as a nearly powerless vestige of borough autonomy, it quickly grew into a
powerful player in city governance at the expense of its role as borough
executive.' 34 With the demise of the Board of Estimate, the role had to be
35
radically redefined in order to sustain its relevance. This was achieved.
Critics of the new status of the borough presidency fail to grasp its
relative role in city governance. Admittedly, the Board of Estimate
wielded enormous power.'3 6 However, each individual borough president
only had one vote on the eleven-vote Board. 37 Additionally, the Board
only became significant at the end of the political process when it would,
in imperial fashion, grant or deny a benefit or impose a burden.' 38 Now,
the shift is away from last-minute, backroom dealings and towards out-inthe-open, long-term agenda settings.139 The borough presidents are playing
a significant role in this emerging paradigm.
Furthermore, now that the borough presidents have returned to their
position as borough executives, they have the opportunity to reorient
themselves to the needs of their constituents. 140 True, they do not exercise
significant individual control over land, contracts, and City services."4
Nonetheless, their input is mandated by the Charter, and a politically bold
borough president can certainly exercise his or her advisory power in a
politically viable manner. 42 In addition, some have discussed granting the
borough presidents more substantive powers. "43 These proposed powers,
unlike those previously held on the Board of Estimate, would not involve
citywide administration; rather, they would involve the constituents whom
they were always intended to serve in the first place-the borough
populace.
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There is borough pride in New York City."' There is also need for a
localized administrative apparatus in a city of New York's size. 145 Just as
a state uses the county system to achieve this end, 4 6 New York should not
hesitate to use the borough system towards the same goal. Certainly, the
borough, in its relationship to the city, has at least as great a claim on some
level of civic autonomy as any county in the nation.
In sum, the role of the borough president has been redefined for the
better. It has been returned to its place as mid-level executive and as
advocate for its respective constituents. Undoubtedly, the debate on
whether to retain the borough presidency will not expire and will certainly
be an important issue for future Charter revisions. 4 7 Its fate at those
junctures will be determined by the will of the people and their
commitment to boroughwide representation and to those who occupy the
office. It will be these two sets of political players and their tenacity or
apathy that will determine what, if any, future the borough president has
in New York City governance.
JonathanHolub & Irina Gonikberg-Dolinskiy
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